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Introduction 
 
With the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) likely to be submitted to Congress for approval in the near 
future, there has been a flurry of reports and articles on its likely impact on the economy. In 
particular, the projections from a model developed by Peter Petri and Michael Plummer have 
received a great deal of attention (Petri and Plummer 2016). The projections from their model, 
which were published by the Peterson Institute showed that the gains to the U.S. economy from the 
TPP would be 0.5 percent of GDP when the impact of the agreement is fully realized in 2030. This 
projection and other projections from the model have been widely cited. In addition, Robert 
Lawrence used the industry specific projections of job losses and gains to produce estimates of the 
transition costs that the workers displaced as a result of the agreement would experience (Lawrence 
2016).  
 
While proponents of the TPP have eagerly cited these studies to support their case, it is important to 
recognize that the projections are only useful insofar as the Petri and Plummer model can be seen as 
an accurate guide to the outcome of trade agreements. After all, it is possible to produce models that 
show radically different effects. For example, a model developed by Francis Cripps and Alex Izurieta 
showed the TPP would actually cost the United States 448,000 jobs and lead to a loss in GDP of 
0.54 percent by 2025 (Capaldo and Izurieta 2016). 
 
This paper examines the extent to which computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the type 
used by Petri and Plummer, and also by the International Trade Commission (ITC), can be seen as 
providing useful predictions of the impact of trade agreements. The main focus will be an analysis of 
predictions for the impact of the recent trade agreement that the United States signed with South 
Korea. It compares the projections for winning and losing industries with actual outcomes. An 
appendix examines the Petri and Plummer projections for job-losing industries by applying their 
projections to a more detailed industry list. 
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The Track Record of Computable General 
Equilibrium Models  
 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have long been the standard tool within the 
economics profession for predicting the impact of trade agreements. These models include a 
number of inherently unrealistic assumptions, most importantly that the economy is near its full 
employment level of output. This assumption can be justified if it is assumed that the economy 
generally remains close to its full employment level of output or, at least, that departures from full 
employment due to recessions are not long lasting.  
 
CGE models also implicitly assume that the trade deals themselves do not directly affect 
macroeconomic outcomes, for example by leading to a larger trade deficit that can result in a loss of 
aggregate demand and higher levels of unemployment. In this respect, it is worth noting that 
following three of the major trade openings by the United States in the last quarter century — the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China, 
and the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) — there was a large increase in the U.S. trade 
deficit with the partner country. While the rise in the trade deficit may have been due to factors 
other than the agreement itself, the impact of this deficit overwhelmed the impact of reducing trade 
barriers projected in the CGE models. In other words, the unpredicted impact of the rise in the 
trade deficit was far larger than any of the predicted effects from these models. 
 
Even if the CGE models did not capture the factors that led to the rise in the trade deficits in these 
cases, it is interesting to ask whether they at least correctly identified the winning and losing sectors. 
In this area, their track record has not been especially good either. Grinspun examined the industry-
specific projections of winners and losers from the U.S.–Canada trade agreement that took effect in 
1988 (Grinspun 1991). The analysis found that there was virtually no correlation between 
projections of gaining and losing industries across models, nor was there a strong correlation 
between any of the models’ projections and the actual changes in industry output following the 
implementation of the agreement.  
 
In a similar vein, Kehoe (2005) examined the accuracy of the projections of three frequently cited 
CGE models on the impact of NAFTA. This analysis found that these models hugely 
underestimated the overall impact of NAFTA on trade. It also found little correlation between the 
projections of winners and losers across industries.  
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The KORUS provides another opportunity to assess the accuracy of CGE models. The analysis in 
the next section examines the extent to which the projections of the impact of the KORUS from the 
CGE model used by the ITC coincided with the subsequent changes in trade patterns.1 
 
 
The Accuracy of the ITC Projections of the 
Impact of the KORUS 
  
In May of 2007, the ITC issued a report analyzing the likely impact of the KORUS on the U.S. 
economy. At the center of this analysis were its projections for its industry-specific impact from its 
CGE model. As is standard with CGE models, the projections assume no impact on aggregate 
demand and employment, apart from the extent to which higher productivity can lead to higher 
wages, which in turn induce more people to work. The model assumes that the trade agreement 
itself has no direct impact on aggregate demand over the time period examined. 
 
As a practical matter, there were major macroeconomic developments between when the projections 
were made in 2007 and when the agreement finally took effect in 2012. The collapse of the housing 
bubble threw the U.S. economy into the worst recession since the Great Depression. A similar 
collapse in Europe pushed most of the world into a recession. As a result, the macroeconomic 
environment was clearly quite different in 2012 when the agreement took effect than in 2007 when 
the ITC made its projections. 
 
It is also worth noting that there was a large and unpredicted increase in the size of the U.S. trade 
deficit with South Korea following the implementation of the KORUS. The U.S. trade deficit with 
South Korea more than doubled from $13.2 billion in 2011, the last year before the agreement took 
effect to $28.3 billion in 2015.2 While this rise in the trade deficit may not have been a direct result 
of the KORUS, at the least it indicates that large factors were affecting U.S. trade with Korea that 
were not assumed by the ITC model. 
 
Even if the ITC model failed to pick up this large rise in the trade deficit, it is still possible that it 
was at least successful in identifying the relative winners and losers by sector. To assess its accuracy 
                                                 
1  ITC (2007). 
2  Bureau of the Census (2016). 
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in these projections, we constructed a counterfactual baseline, which assumed that imports and 
exports by sector both followed the trend path that they were on before the KORUS took effect for 
each of the 38 industries for which the ITC report made projections. Since there are substantial 
annual variations in reported export and import levels by industry, three-year averages were used for 
the years 2006–08 and 2009–11. We calculated the growth for each industry between these two 
periods and projected that it would continue through the years 2013–15. This was the baseline used 
for comparison with the actual change in exports and imports by sector. 
 
We then calculated the variation between actual exports and imports in 2013–15 and the constructed 
baseline. The percentage changes were then regressed against the percentage changes projected by 
the ITC model. The first column of Table 1 shows the regression results for export industries. As 
can be seen, the coefficient of the predicted change is negative, albeit nowhere close to statistically 
significant. This means that the ITC model’s predictions of which industries would see their exports 
increase the most as a result of the KORUS were of little value, and in fact predicted winners were 
more likely to be losers and vice versa. Figure 1 shows the actual percent change in exports by 
industry against the projected percent change.  
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FIGURE 1 
Expected and Actual Changes in Exports Relative to Baseline (Robust Regression) 
 
 
Source and notes: ITC (2016), United Nations (2016), and authors’ calculations. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, there is no clear relationship between the expected effect of the KORUS on 
exports to Korea and the actual change in exports relative to trend. Indeed, some sectors for which 
the ITC did not expect large effects saw very large changes in U.S. exports. For example, sugar plant 
exports had been falling rapidly prior to the KORUS and rebounded much more rapidly than ITC’s 
projection of 0.2–0.3 percent. At the other extreme, U.S. exports of coal fell rapidly and exports of 
oil and gas grew far less rapidly than they had prior to the KORUS.  
 
TABLE 1 
Export Regressions 
Dependent 
Variable 
Percent Change Log Change 
Regression Type OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Expected change -7.1 (7.6) 0.003 (0.119) -0.04 (0.58) -0.05 (0.26) 
Constant 1026 (1013) -8 (9) -0.001 (0.375) -0.03 (0.11) 
Source and notes: Authors’ estimates using ITC (2016) and United Nations (2016). “OLS” is ordinary 
least squares with robust standard errors; “Robust” is regression with screening for outliers. Standard 
errors in parentheses: ** 1 percent; * 5 percent; # 10 percent. 
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We did the same exercise with imports. In this case also the coefficient on the predicted change was 
negative, as shown in the first column of Table 2. As was the case with exports, the ITC predictions 
that an industry would see a sharp rise in imports was likely to indicate the opposite, although again 
the result is nowhere near being statistically significant. Figure 2 shows the actual percent change in 
imports from baseline by industry against the percent change projected by the ITC report. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Expected and Actual Changes in Imports Relative to Baseline 
 
 
Source and notes: ITC (2016), United Nations (2016), and authors’ calculations. 
 
As with U.S. exports to Korea, imports from Korea looked very different than what pre-KORUS 
trends would suggest — even accounting for the predicted effects of the agreement. Imports from 
forestry and logging were falling prior to KORUS coming into effect, yet doubled in the years that 
followed. The ITC predicted no effect on sugar imports from the KORUS but actual imports fell 
after rapid import growth in the years leading up. Similarly, the ITC predicted KORUS would shrink 
coal imports by as much as 0.3 percent, but after years of increases, coal imports from Korea fell by 
a factor of 10 in the years after the agreement.  
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TABLE 2 
Import Regressions 
Dependent 
Variable 
Percent Change Log Change 
Regression Type OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Expected change -1.0 (1.7) 0.7 (0.3)* 0.6 (0.6) 0.4 (0.5) 
Constant 218 (179) 24 (18)# 0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.1)# 
Source and notes: Authors’ estimates using ITC (2016) and United Nations (2016). “OLS” is ordinary 
least squares with robust standard errors; “Robust” is regression with screening for outliers. Standard 
errors in parentheses: ** 1 percent; * 5 percent; # 10 percent. 
 
In short, in the case of both exports and imports, the ITC model not only missed the large rise in 
the trade deficit that followed the implementation of the KORUS, it also misidentified the winning 
and losing industries. It clearly was not a useful guide as to the expected impact of KORUS on U.S. 
trade with Korea. 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
This paper notes the poor track record of CGE models like the ones used by the Peterson Institute 
and the ITC in projecting the changes in patterns of trade following recent trade deals. These 
models failed to project the large rise in the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico following the 
implementation of NAFTA or with South Korea following the implementation of KORUS. Past 
research has shown that these models also failed to correctly identify the winning and losing 
industries in trade with Mexico following NAFTA. This analysis shows that the ITC model similarly 
failed to identify winning and losing industries following the implementation of the KORUS.  
 
This history should raise questions about the accuracy of projections from CGE models being used 
to project the impact of the TPP, such as the Petri and Plummer model or the CGE model that the 
ITC will be using for its forthcoming analysis. These models have not only failed to predict major 
changes in the trade balance, they also have been largely unsuccessful in identifying the industries 
that win and lose following the implementation of recent trade pacts. For this reason, it is very 
questionable whether these models can provide useful insight into the effects of the TPP and its 
impact on the labor market and the economy.  
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Appendix: Projected Job Losses by Industry 
from the TPP 
  
Table A1 uses the Petri and Plummer projections for employment as a result of the TPP and 
translates them into more narrow industry groups. The projections assume that within each of the 
industry groups identified in the Petri and Plummer analysis, job gains or losses are spread 
proportionately across industries. 
 
TABLE A1 
Projected Changes in Industry Employment Due to Trans-Pacific Partnership 
BEA line 
number 
BEA item description 
Wage and 
salary per 
FTE in 2014 
BEA persons 
employed in 2014 
(thousands) 
BEA persons 
employed in 2030 
(PP baseline) 
BEA persons 
employed in 2030 
(PP with TPP) 
Change in 
2030 due 
to TPP 
5      Farms $38,114 2734 1362.0 1362.3 0.3 
6      Forestry, fishing, and related activities $33,568 581 581.0 581.5 0.5 
7  Mining $116,022 758 1063.1 1064.7 1.7 
11  Utilities $101,545 543 560.1 559.0 -1.1 
12  Construction $56,217 7843 10657.5 10691.4 34.0 
15      Wood products $43,516 374 412.5 409.9 -2.6 
16      Nonmetallic mineral products $55,308 391 431.2 428.5 -2.7 
17      Primary metals $66,870 395 420.0 413.2 -6.7 
18      Fabricated metal products $55,509 1465 1557.8 1532.5 -24.9 
19      Machinery $69,013 1108 1081.0 1059.3 -21.3 
20      Computer and electronic products $108,602 1038 1012.7 992.4 -20.0 
21      Electrical equipment, appliances, and components $66,041 375 287.5 295.4 8.1 
22      Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts $61,200 872 975.3 979.1 3.8 
23      Other transportation equipment $89,885 679 759.4 762.4 3.0 
24      Furniture and related products $42,505 395 435.7 432.9 -2.7 
25      Miscellaneous manufacturing $62,380 620 683.8 679.5 -4.2 
27      Food and beverage and tobacco products $47,468 1666 1671.3 1694.9 23.9 
28      Textile mills and textile product mills $43,078 488 233.0 202.1 -26.8 
29      Apparel and leather and allied products $41,029 350 167.1 145.0 -19.2 
30      Paper products $68,431 359 395.9 393.5 -2.5 
31      Printing and related support activities $48,650 468 516.2 512.9 -3.2 
32      Petroleum and coal products $113,344 108 151.5 151.7 0.2 
33      Chemical products $94,406 809 887.2 879.1 -8.1 
34      Plastics and rubber products $51,352 669 733.7 726.9 -6.7 
35   Wholesale trade $73,078 5917 6945.3 6955.2 9.9 
38   Retail trade $30,614 15655 18375.6 18401.8 26.2 
43   Transportation and warehousing $60,180 4367 5125.9 5133.2 7.3 
53      Publishing industries (includes software) $115,800 810 866.9 869.0 2.1 
54      Motion picture and sound recording industries $72,960 440 470.9 472.1 1.2 
55      Broadcasting and telecommunications $87,907 1082 1158.0 1160.8 2.9 
56      Information and data processing services $120,213 355 379.9 380.9 0.9 
57   Finance and insurance $100,734 5990 6548.9 6539.2 -9.7 
62   Real estate and rental and leasing $57,255 2333 2550.7 2546.9 -3.8 
66      Legal services $93,709 1279 1457.5 1462.9 5.4 
67      Computer systems design and related services $110,408 1814 2067.2 2074.9 7.7 
68      Miscellaneous professional, scientific, technical services $85,768 5989 6824.9 6850.2 25.5 
69   Management of companies and enterprises $123,282 2008 2288.2 2296.8 8.5 
71      Administrative and support services $39,162 8428 9214.3 9200.7 -13.6 
72      Waste management and remediation services $57,831 400 412.6 411.8 -0.8 
73   Educational services $44,628 3281 3681.0 3681.9 0.9 
74   Health care and social assistance $51,373 17331 19443.6 19448.5 4.8 
79   Arts, entertainment, and recreation $46,229 2194 2461.4 2462.1 0.6 
82   Accommodation and food services $26,451 10348 11609.4 11612.3 2.9 
85   Other services, except government $39,737 6951 7798.3 7800.3 1.9 
86 Government $61,478 20125 22578.2 22583.9 5.6 
Source and notes: Petri, Peter (2016), U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2016), and authors’ calculations. 
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